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l INTRODUCTION
Disasters are characterised - almost by definition - by substantial damage.
It is precisely because of their scale that disasters result not only in a large
number of victims, but in many different types of victims and in many differ-
ent types of damages.
For instance, the Woerden disaster1 is a good example of the potential
Variation in types of victims. Some were involved either directly or to a lesser
degree with the factory that exploded, for example äs owners, employees,
customers, etc. Others were bystanders: demonstrators (active or passive) or
chance passers-by. There were also public sector personnel involved in the
disaster: fire fighters, police officers and rescue workers. Finally, there were
the ordinary citizens who lived or were present in the neighbourhood where
the disaster occurred. The Enschede2 disaster had, if anything, even more
victims, since it occurred in the centre of a densely populated residential area:
examples of victims in this case were the residente themselves and their
relatives elsewhere in the neighbourhood, the municipality and the country.
These are the victims. But the types of damage the disaster created also
vary greatly. For example, some victims suffered personal injury (both pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary), damage to property, and business damage (such äs
loss of profit). The public at large suffered from environmental damage. In
an earlier contribution to this book we dealt at greater length with the estab-
lishment of liability: i.e., who is liable and on what grounds. This present
article centres on a particularly difficult issue of personal injury: is psychiatric
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The Disaster and Law Conference centred on a fictitious case: the Woerden disaster. This
concerned an explosion at a chemical plant in the municipality of Woerden. The explosion
was said to have caused great damage to the plant, to people on and near the site and,
äs a result of the release of clouds of toxic gas, to the inhabitants of the municipality.
The Enschede disaster was a real disaster. It occurred on Saturday 13 May 2000, two weeks
before the Conference. A firework factory located in a residential area of the city exploded
and wiped out an entire district. Pecuniary damage was caused in a very wide radius of
the factory. Over 40 people died and hundreds were injured.
128 D.I. Levine & C.J.J.M. Stoiker
damage eligible for reimbursement and, if so, whose psychiatric damage should
be reimbursed?
As a result of the tragic aircraft crash in the Bijlmer neighbourhood of
Amsterdam in 1992, the Netherlands has gained experience in handling cases
involving large and varied damage. The Netherlands has, incidentally, suffered
aircraft disasters on other occasions too.
A Boeing 747 cargo plane owned and operated by El AI Airlines crashed
some ten minutes after departure into an apartment building in the Bijlmer
neighbourhood of Amsterdam on 4 October 1992. The building was destroyed
and many people lost their lives äs a consequence of the crash. This accident
raised questions about the application of international air law, its deficiencies,
and the efficacy of recourse to national law, especially that of the United States
and The Netherlands.3
More than 40 people died and dozens more were seriously injured when
the plane crashed into the apartment building. The damage was substantial
both in terms of human suffering äs well äs in damage to property. Although
the human suffering can be partially expressed in terms of injuries and deaths,
injuries from such an accident can ränge wellbeyond the physical. In the case
of psychiatric damage, one first thinks of victims who were directly affected
and who will, because of the accident, encounter problems of a psychiatric
nature such äs attacks of fear or anxieties.4 But one also has to think of those
victims who, although not directly affected themselves by the accident, have
lost loved ones, or even have seen their loved ones being killed. These losses
cause them to suffer mentally äs well.
As far äs the damage related to those directly affected - i.e., the occupants
and owners of the apartments affected - the settlement of the damage Claims
proved not to be particularly complicated. Indeed, the extent of the compensa-
tion could be determined fairly easily using the normal methods. In order to
avoid borderline cases, a circle was also drawn around the disaster area within
which the so-called zone of danger was located. For all those whose goods
and chattels were affected within the circle, Boeing and El AI agreed to be
satisfied with relatively scant proof.5
One category of victim in particular, however, gave rise to legal questions,
namely victims who were not affected directly and physically by the crash.
The defendants and a number of victims were unable to agree on whether
these victims too were entitled to compensation for damage and, if so, for what
See further P. Mendes de Leon and S. Mirmina, The International and American Law Im-
plications of the Bijlmer Air Disaster, Leiden Journal of International Law 1993, p. 111 et seq.
A study of survivors of the Bijlmer crash showed that seventy percent of those interviewed
suffered from füll or partial Postraumatic Stress Disorder. I.V.E. Carlier and B.P.R. Gersons,
Partial Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): The Issue of Psychological Sears and the
Occurrence of PTSD Symptoms, /. Nerv. & Ment. Dis. 1995, 183: p. 107-09.
See judgement of Amsterdam District Court, 19 Jury 2000, H 98.0820, at legal consideration
no. 8.
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damage. This is not really surprising: our 1997 article6 noted that there were
various theories in existence, particularly in the US and the United Kingdom;
in other countries the problem had hardly even been considered.
In our previous article, we wrote that the reasonable foreseeability
approach, äs exemplified by a decision reached by the California Supreme
Court, Dillon v. Legg,7 appealed to us the most, at least in so far it amounted
to a multifactor approach.8 In the present article, we provide an Update of
our thinking on the question of whether or not victims outside the zone of
danger are entitled to compensation for damage. We then go on to discuss
and assess the recent decision of the Amsterdam District Court, which has
now given judgement in the dispute between Boeing, El AI, and 23 plaintiffs
who were outside the zone of danger. Finally, we make a proposal designed
to strike a fair balance between the concerns regarding unlimited Claims for
emotional distress and the needs of injured victims of disasters.
2 INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
2.1 The concern with compensating for psychiatric damage
Psychiatric damage has become more and more a focus of attention over the
last few years in liability law in general.9 Mass disasters, such äs explosions
and air crashes, are no exception.10 In addition to damage to property and
physical injuries, psychiatric damage will occur in many such accidents. For
example, one could imagine all sorts of anxieties and neuroses arising from
an aviation accident, which would negatively influence a victim's daily life.
The consequences could ränge from the fear of ever flying again to even more
serious effects such äs grave emotional distress, unemployment or divorce.
These possibilities apply, of course, to all those victims who sustained
physical injury themselves.11 But the number of potential victims will often
6 Carel J.J.M. Stoiker and David I. Levine, 'Compensation for Damage to Parties on the
Ground äs a Result of Aviation Accidents', 22 Air & Space L. 1997, 60.
7 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
8 Stoiker and Levine, op, dt. p. 67.
9 See, e.g., Michael J. Pangia, 'Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Litigation Strategies', /. Air L.
& Comm. 1999, 64, p. 1091.
10 See, e.g., Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, 'Mental Distress in Aviation Claims - Emergent
Trends', /. Air L. & Comm., 2000,65, p. 225; Note, 'Mental Injury' and the Montreal Conven-
tion 1999, The Aviation Q. 2000-1:51 (2000); Comment, The Aftermath of the Airplane
Accident: Recovery of Damages for Psychological Injuries Accompanied by Physical Injuries
Under the Warsaw Convention, 84 Marquette L. Rev. 227 (2000); Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne,
Mental Injury Caused in Accidents During International Air Carriage - A Point of View,
The Aviation Q. 1999-4: 206 (1999).
11 E.g., Richard A. Levy, Mental Stress and Physical Factors in the Terminal Phase of Fatal
Aircraft Accidents, /. Air L. & Comm., 65:45 (1999).
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be a lot larger. The difficulty lies often with bystanders, who might have
witnessed the accident, or relatives of passengers who, from a distance, were
also victims of the disaster äs a result of the härm done to their loved ones.
Should any of these bystanders qualify for compensation of their psychiatric
damage?
Cases involving such accidents have forced courts to examine the outermost
limits of recovery for bystanders who, although themselves not physically
injured, have nevertheless suffered extreme emotional shock and psychological
injury. Scientific psychiatric research after the Lockerbie, Scotland air disaster
has shown how severe that psychiatric damage can be.12 However, courts
in many countries, like the US, have often expressed a certain reserve in grant-
ing an award for damage to the psyche.
The arguments in f avour of this caution are familiär. They usually fall into
the following categories: (a) mental disturbance often will be of a temporary
and slight nature; (b) psychiatric damage can be simulated;13 (c) determining
the nature and duration of the damage is often difficult; (d) the plaintiff may
have an 'eggshell skull'; i.e., he/she may be especially vulnerable to psychiatric
damage; (e) the emotional distress härm may become manifest at a time and
place that is too remote from the alleged cause of the injury; and (f) there will
be an infinite number of emotional distress Claims filed in court; in denying
claims, courts often raise the spectre of Opening the flood gates' or starting
down a 'slippery slope'.14
12 See Neu Brooks and William McKinlay, Mental Health Consequences of the Lockerbie
Disaster, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 1994, pp. 52711.
13 Attitudes regarding the reality of psychiatric damage seem to be changing. For example,
the last edition of what was once the leading US treatise on the subject, Prasser and Keeton
on Torts, West Publishing Co., 5th ed., 1984, at 361, asserted: 'Mental disturbance is easily
simulated, and courts which are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may be
unwilling to open the door to an even more dubious field'. On the other hand, the successor
treatise takes a more balanced view: 'In the past, at least, courts have often expressed
concerns about the reality of emotional distress, but in most cases the reality or existence
of the distress is not in doubt.' Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, West Group, 2000, p. 822-23.
14 See Sir Thomas Bingham MR in his foreword to Nicholas J. Mullany and Peter R. Handford,
Tort Liabihtyfor Psychiatrie Damage, The Law Book Company Ltd., 1993 (at p. vii): 'Under-
lying the cases has been the judges' concern that unless the limits of liability are tightly
drawn the courts will be inundated with a flood of claims by plaintiffs ever more distant
from the scene of the original mishap. So fine distinctions have been drawn and strict lines
of demarcation established.' See also his comments in dissent in M v. Newham LBC [1994]
2 WLR 554,573. The Law Commissian Consultation Paper No. 137, Liabihtyfor Psychiatrie Illness,
HMSO 1995, discusses his comments in some detail in par. 2.6 and 2.7. There is further
discussion of floodgates argument in par. 4.2-4.6. The Law Commission's subsequent report
to the British Parliament, Liabihtyfor Psychiatrie Illness, Law Com. No. 249, 1998, found,
in par. 6.8, that it would be imprudent to take the risk of opening the floodgates to all
reasonably foreseeable claims of psychiatric injury.
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Nevertheless, in the United States and other countries such äs Australia
and the United Kingdom/5 all these difficulties have not resulted in a general
rule rejecting Claims for compensation in cases of psychiatric damage. The
well-known adage, 'the tortfeasor takes the victim äs he finds him', is usually
applied äs a point of departure.16 Furthermore, it is considered to be possible
to distinguish fake cases from cases where genuine psychiatric damage
occurred. For example, the British Law Commission's extensive report on
psychiatric damage notes that the psychiatric profession recognises the possibil-
ity of false or exaggerated claims. However, the Commission report asserts
that feigned Symptoms can be detected with careful clinical evaluation. In
addition, '[njumerous tests have been developed which can help to ascertain
whether an individual has faked or exaggerated psychological Symptoms and
whether he or she is a reliable Informant. The tests are objective and are often
scored by a Computer/17
2.2 Which victims have a right to compensation: various tests
Corisider the ränge of potential victims with psychiatric damage äs a result
of major disasters: (a) victims who themselves also sustained physical injury
äs a result of the disaster (sometimes called primary victims); (b) victims who
did not sustain physical injury, but who were near the disaster site and
witnessed the accident, knowing that äs they were in the zone of danger, they
could have sustained physical injuries; (c) those who, while not within the
zone of danger themselves, saw others, especially loved ones, being killed or
injured; (d) victims who did not witness the accident but heard of it later and
feared for the safety of others, particularly their loved ones; (e) the rescue
workers who provided emergency aid after the accident; and (f) other vic-
tims.18
Although there is very little case law, Dutch law tends to be rather gener-
ous when it comes to compensation of psychiatric damage. This tendency is
exemplified in the approach taken regarding 'compensation neurosis.' For
example, in one case, Henderson, a Student and member of a steel band, feil
15 Mullany and Handford, op. dt. at p. 10 (England and Australia have been less reluctant
than US courts Open up the gates of liability')· For an analysis of the reluctance of the courts
to grant emotional distress damages from a feminist point of view, see, e.g., Martha Chamal-
las, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. Pennsylvania L. Rev. 463
(1998); Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist
Critique, 14 Law & Inequality 391 (1996).
16 For an argument that tort law should not 'equate thin skins and thin skulls', see Tony Weir,
Book Review, [1993] Cambridge L.J. 520 at 521. See also Lawson v. Management Activities,
Inc., 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 745,749 (Cal.App. 1999) (contending that 'tort law cannot countenance
the doctrine of the "eggshell psyche".').
17 The Law Commission Report, op. dt. at par. 3.32.
18 See the categorisation of victims in The Law Commission Report, op. dt., par. 2.12-2.60.
132 D.i. Levme & C.J.J.M. Stoiker
off a float during the carnival in Aruba. In the chaos, due to a misunderstand-
ing, Gibbs, a deputy inspector of police, beat hitn several times with a baton.
The victim developed a 'compensation neurosis'. The Dutch law professor
Hans Nieuwenhuis points out that an actual compensation neurosis leads to
a real, not simulated, disability. Similar to a victim who can not be condemned
for the fact that he is suffering from exceptionally brittle bones, a person with
compensation neurosis can not be condemned for the fact that he is suffering
from an involuntarily, and non-culpable, need for compensation. The Dutch
Supreme Court reached the same result, and supported Henderson's claim:
In an unlawful act, constituting of inflicting injury, the consequences of a reaction
determined by the personal predisposition of the victim will be generally regarded
äs a result of the unlawful act and imputed to the perpetrator, even when this
reaction is also caused by the neurotic need of the victim to receive compensation
and even when the consequences are thereby more severe and last longer than
normally would be expected.19
In settling the Bijlmer damage claims out of court, the victims with physical
injury and who also have suffered psychiatric damage have had their injuries
compensated. That group did not pose a problem because they fit within the
most restrictive test, which is still applied by some American courts: those
who can prove physical injury are also entitled to compensation for any
resulting psychiatric damage.20 It goes without saying that under Dutch law
this - what the Americans call the physical injury-test - is a minimum test.
Some American courts, too, have gone further by modifying the physical
injury rule into a 'physical impact test', so that even when there had been no
infliction of injury, but sometimes just a slight 'touch', the judge could award
damages for the psychiatric damage that occurred.21 Alternatively, some states
in the US have required proof that the psychiatric damage has led to a mani-
festation of physical injury.22
Courts in the US, however, constantly struggle with the question of whether
plaintiffs with emotional distress claims must meet special restrictions. There-
fore, the people who have not sustained physical injury but who nevertheless
claim to have suffered psychiatric damage pose a problem. Will psychiatric
19 19 HR 8 februari 1985, NJ1986,137 (annotation by C.J.H. Brunner); AA1985,417 (annotation
by J.H. Nieuwenhuis).
20 E.g., In re Air Crash Oisaster Near Cerntos, California (Estrada), 967 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1992)
(damages awarded for family killed when airliner crashed into home).
21 E.g., Lee v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 2000) (confirming
that Georgia follows the impact rule). Only five US states still follow the physical impact
or injury test. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 US 532 n. 7 (1994) (citing cases).
22 Prosser and Keeton, op. at, at 364 credit the origins of this test to an Irish case, Bell v. Great
Northern Raüway [1890] L.R. 26 Ir. Rep. 428. The first US case applying this test was Hül
v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210,13 SW 59 (Texas 1890) US courts do not have a clear rule äs to what
will qualify äs a sufficient physical consequence from the damage to the psyche. See: Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (surveying different Standards).
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damage also be compensated if physical injury or 'impact' has not accompanied
the violation of the Standard of care?23 With the gradual recognition that
psychiatric damage was an equally serious form of injury äs physical injury,
many courts and commentators have seen no justification in treating these
cases differently. For example, the English author Munkman states:
Where a neurosis claim arises out of an accident, there has usually been some
physical injury or at least shock, which would be actionable in any case, and
neurosis supervenes afterwards; or eise the accident aggravates an existing neurotic
state. But there seems no reason why an action should not lie for causing neurosis
alone in the absence of injury or shock (if such a thing is possible). A recognisable
illness is something more than the unhappy or painful thoughts which, äs already
indicated, are not in themselves a subject of compensation24
In some jurisdictions, and also in the out of court settlement of the Bijlmer
disaster, the more flexible 'zone of physical danger'-iest has been applied, instead
of the 'physical injury' requirement.25 Around the accident, a zone of danger
is proclaimed. The claim will be permitted without proof of physical injury
or impact äs long äs the claimant was within the zone of danger and possessed
a 'reasonable fear of injury'.26 With the help of this fest, many cases of damage
to the psyche can be dealt with. Most jurisdictions in the US now recognise
the zone of physical danger rule äs a minimum fest for liability.27 In settling
23 See, e.g., Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal School, Inc., 759 So.2d 1203 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 2000)
(listing circumstances when injury is and is not required äs prerequisite for recovery for
mental anguish under Mississippi law); Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 US
424 (1997) (interpreting Federal Employers' Liability Act to require manifested Symptoms
of disease in order to recover for emotional distress; mere physical contact with substance
- asbestos - that might cause disease in the future does not qualify äs a physical impact);
Longus Ό. Columbia Management, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 13 (D.C.D.C. 1987) (requiring a 'physical-
injury causing impact' äs pre-requisite to recover for emotional distress allegedly resulting
from a gas explosion in an apartment).
24 John Munkman, Damagesfor Personal Injunes and Death, Butterworths 1993, at p. 128. The
Law Commission Consultation Paper (1995), op. at. note 14 above at par. 2.4), too, makes
clear that the plaintiff must suffer a recognised psychiatric illness that, at least where the
plaintiff is a secondary victim, must be shock-induced; transitory fear and anxiety are
inadequate.
25 Probably the first case announcing this test was Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 KB 669.
26 E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, California (DiCosta), 973 F.2d 1490,1494 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing recovery for emotional distress to couple who feared for their own safety
due to proximity to mid-air collision of two planes over their neighbourhood). But see
Lawson v. Management Actmties, Inc., 69 Cal.App.4th 652,81 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (denying recovery for emotional distress suffered by physically untouched spectators
of plane crash who reasonably feared for their own safety äs they witnessed plane fall out
of the sky).
27 The American Law Institute adopted the zone of danger rule in Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 313, 436 (1965). See, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 858 n. 9 (Connecticut
Supreme Court 1996) (citing cases of 13 US states adopting the zone of danger rule) and
862 n. 11 (citing cases from 24 other states adopting even broader rule). The Supreme Court
of the United States has adopted the zone of danger rule for cases arising under one
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the Bijlmer disaster claims, application of the zone of danger test appears to
have been the decisive factor for many victims (see, however, paragraph 3
below).28
2.3 A multifactor approach
Nevertheless, the zone of danger test does not always lead to satisfactory
results. Many real victims receive no compensation because, at the time of
the disaster, they were outside the zone of danger. Take, for example, a man
who was at the time of the crash in the centre of Amsterdam. When he heard
about the Bijlmer disaster, he immediately realised that his small children were
at home in the disaster-stricken apartment building. After several hours it
emerged that his children had survived. In the meantime, the man had become
mentally a wreck. It is a fact that this victim was never inside the zone of
danger. It is also a fact that the man has sustained some measure of psychiatric
damage. But, according to the zone of danger test, he is not entitled to compen-
sation, äs he was outside that zone. The disagreeableness of this test is that
it does not allow for the fear for the lives of children and partners. Here the
zone of danger test works indiscriminately. Whoever was within the zone will
easily get compensation, even when the psychiatric damage is slight; anyone
outside the zone and has possibly suffered severe damage gets nothing at all.
For example, in the American case Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,29
a mother who died of a heart attack caused by learning that her son had died
in a plane crash was denied compensation under Massachusetts law because
she was a substantial distance from the crash and was told of the death rather
than perceiving the accident herseif. In contrast, a couple who were inside
their house and merely heard a mid-air collision were allowed to recover for
emotional distress under California law because they could have feared
legitimately that the crashing air planes might have hit them or their home.30
As a result of the perceived unf airness created by both the physical injury
and zone of danger tests, the courts of many American states require only
that the psychiatric damage must have been 'reasonablyforeseeabk'. The classic
particular Statute, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which protects railroad workers.
Consolidated Raü Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 US 532 (1994). For recent commentary supporting
the zone of danger rule, see Meredith A. Moore, South Dakota's Interpretation of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress and the 'Zone of Danger' Rule in Nielson v. AT&T Corpora-
tion: A Dangerous Hybrid, 45 South Dakota L. Rev. 379 (2000).
28 See, e.g., Trouw, October 4, 1995. Until the Bijlmer case was decided, no Dutch case law
was available on this issue.
29 450 N.E.2d 581, 590 (Mass. Supreme Judicial Court 1983).
30 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, California (Di Costa), 973 F.2d 1490,1491 (9th Cir. 1992).
The majority and dissenting opinions in a recently decided case in a state court in California
debate whether the Di Costa opinion correctly stated California law on this point. Lawson
v. Management Actwities, Inc., 81 Cal.Rptr.2d (Cal.App.4th 1999).
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example is a mother who sees her child die before her eyes in an accident,
but is not herseif in any physical danger.31 The California Supreme Court
rejected both the zone of danger-test and the physical injury-test in such a
case in 1968: '[We see] no good reason why the general rules of tort law,
including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long
applied to all other types of injury, should not govern the case now before
us. Any questions that the case raises 'will be solved most justly by applying
general principles of duty and negligence, and ... mechanical rules of thumb
which are at variance with these principles do more härm than good.'32
In the Dillon case, the California Supreme Court noted that the law of torts
holds a defendant answerable only for injuries to others that at the time were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Therefore, the court would be guided
by factors such äs the ones which applied to the facts of the Dillon case: a)
whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident äs contrasted
with one who was a distance frorn it; b) whether the shock resulted frorn direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident, äs contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence; and c) whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, äs contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only distant relationship. Many US states have found Dillon's general approach
to be persuasive.33
3l British case law has wrestled with these issues frequently. The Law Commission Report,
op. at., deals extensively with these precedents. For other recent discussion of the British
case law, see, e.g., Nicholas J. Mullany and Peter R. Handford, Hillsborough Revisited,
113 L.Q.R. 410 (1997); H. Teff, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatrie Harm: Justifica-
tions and Boundaries, 57 Cambridge L.J. 91 (1998); T. Feng, Liability for Psychiatrie Illness
- The English Law Commission, 7 Tort L. Rev. 165 (1999). See also Louise Belanger-Hardy,
Nervous Shock, Nervous Courts: The Anns/Kamloops Test to the Rescue?, 37 Alberta L. Rev.
554 (1999) (reviewing Canadian law).
32 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (California Sup. Ct. 1968).
33 At least 27 US states have adopted some form of the rule announced in Dillon. See Clohessy
v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852,862 n. 11 (1996) (citing cases from 24 other states following Dillon;
Connecticut becomes 25th); Marzolfv. Stone, 960 P.2d 424 (Wash. Sup.Ct.1998) (foUowing
Clohessy); Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1999) (following Dillon).
The State of New York is the largest state jurisdiction in the US to have rejected the Dillon
rule and to have chosen to retain the zone of danger rule. Trombetta v. Conkhng, 626 N.E.2d
653 (N.Y. Court of Appeals, 1993). Another question that has arisen is whether the factors
stated in Dillon were to be used äs general guidelines in determining whether the emotional
distress injury was foreseeable or whether the guidelines are actually strict prerequisites
to recovery. Compare, e.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal.Sd 644 (California Sup. Ct. 1989)
(treating factors äs prerequisites) and Blinzer v. Marriott International, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148,
1154 (Ist Cir. 1996) (treating factors äs prerequisites 'serve a critical function in keeping
bystander liability within reasonable bounds') with Marzolf, supra (showing ränge of
approaches in different states). See also Note, Tort Law-New Mexico Limits Recovery of
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress to Sudden, Traumatic Accidents — Fernandez
v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 30 New Mexico L. Rev. 363 (2000).
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The 'reasonable foreseeability' approach of Dillon is especially appealing
where there is such a varied group of victims äs in the Dutch Bijlmer disaster.
This task should be performed under the reasonable foreseeability approach
äs originally created in Dillon itself, rather than the cases transforming the
Dillon factors into formal prerequisites to recovery. Otherwise the courts will
end up making the sort of arbitrary distinctions which have led to the
abandonment of earlier tests such äs physical impact or injury. For example,
in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerntos, California (Estmda),3* the plaintiff was
allowed to recover for her emotional distress which resulted from an aeroplane
crashing into her home and killing her husband and children. Although her
distress was foreseeable, and quite believable, she was able to recover only
because she happened to arrive at the accident scene in time to see her house
in flames and because she had good reason to believe that her husband and
children were trapped in the house. She could not have recovered unless both
of those facts were true.35 Other victims who have sustained emotional dis-
tress under just slightly different circumstances have been denied recovery.36
2.4 Assessing the injury and damage
Despite the reservations that many US courts have expressed over the years
in cases where psychiatric damage is not accompanied by physical injury, for
two groups of cases a more liberal policy has been developed. First are cases
involving mistakes in the circulation of shocking news, especially where
someone's death has been wrongly announced.37 Second are cases where a
human corpse is negligently handled without due care and respect.38 Prosser
believed that courts have treated these cases with less reserve because of 'an
especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the
34 967 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1992).
35 Ibid.
36 E.g., Marzolfv. Stone, 960 P.2d 424 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1998) (reviewing the spectrum of rules
other courts have used to deflne liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
rejecting bright line rule limiting recovery only to those who have witnessed an accident);
McFarlane v. Wilkinson, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 259 (EngUsh Court of Appeal rejects Claims
of plaintiffs who witnessed deadly series of large explosions and fires destroying a manned
oil rig from vantage of support ship which never got closer than 50 metres to the rig).
37 E.g., Chizma v. Machte, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995) (misdiagnosis of AIDS); Johnson v. State
ofNew York, 37 N.Y.2d 378,372 N.Y.S.2d 638,334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975) (hospital
incorrectly notified daughter that her mother had died). Similarly, a court in Ontario,
Canada, awarded damages to a widow who was informed that her husband had committed
suicide when he had acrually drowned in his bath due to negligent supervision in a mental
hospital. Jinks υ. Cardwell, [1987] 39 CCLT 168. See B. McDaniel, Liability of Hospital or
Similar Institution for Giving Erroneous Notification of Patient's Death, 77 ALR 3d 501 (1977
and 1999 Supp.).
38 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 Boston U.L. Rev. 359 (2000).
10 - Compensattng for psychiatric damage öfter disasters 137
special circumstances, which serves äs a guarantee that the claim is not spuri-
ous'.39
The same may apply to our subject, major accidents: for the inherently
shocking nature of exploding chemical plants or aviation accidents is seif-
evident.40 The question may be more whether public policy will support
extending liability to those emotionally or psychologically harmed indirectly
by a horrifying accident.41 A second, equally important, question is whether
this damage can be insured against and at a reasonable rate.42
Under Dutch law, both the physical äs well äs the psychiatric damage are
open to compensation.43 The principal rule is that damage to the psyche will
be imputed to the liable person, even when the psychiatric damage can also
be blamed on the personal predisposition of the victim. Special personal
circumstances regarding the victim do not break the chain of causation. It is,
however, established case law in The Netherlands that any predisposition of
the victim has to be taken into account when estimating damages and award-
ing compensation, because some forms of physical or mental disorder can
increase the possibility of certain injuries.
Nevertheless, for American law the conclusion is that in general, plaintiffs
who seek recovery for emotional distress arising from witnessing or learning
of disasters such äs airline crashes have not been successful very often.44 It
follows from the above that we disagree with the trend of these results. In
our opinion, the issue of whether a breach of the duty of care has been ac-
companied by physical violation of the plaintiff, or the presence or absence
of the factors identified in the Dillon case, can play a role in establishing the
gravity and seriousness of the alleged psychiatric damage, but should not be
a pre-requisite to recovery. We agree with the Australian authors Mullany
and Handford that '[djifferences in the strengths of various types of claims
can be reflected in the quantum of damages awarded rather than leading to
39 Prosser and Keeton, op. at.., at p. 362.
40 See Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law (1997 revised edition) par. 6.04[1],
41 See Htslop v. Sah Rwer Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Distnct, 5 P.3d 267 (Ariz.
App. 2000)(making decision expressly on basis of policy that plaintiffs may not recover
for entirely foreseeable emotional distress damages suffered by witnessing close friend
and co-worker electrocuted and engulfed in a ball of fire).
42 For estimates on the increased cost of insurance premiums if psychiatric damages were
more widely available, see Law Commission Report, op. at., at par. 1.12-1.13.
43 See article 6:106 Civil Code: 'The victim has the right to an equitably determined reparation
of härm other than patrimonial (= pecuniary) damage... if the victim has suffered physical
injury, injury to honour or reputation or if his person has been otherwise afflicted...' New
Netherlands Civil Code, Patrimonial Law, Translated by P.P.C. Haanappel and Ejan Mackaay,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer — Boston 1990.
44 Kreindler, op at., par. 6.04[6], discusses one such example. In Bode v. Pan American World
Airways Inc., 786 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1986), wimesses to an air crash were not allowed to
recover under Louisiana law for their emotional distress.
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the automatic exclusion of some actions ..Λ45 It might also be appropriate
for the legislature to establish some arbitrary limits, such äs a maximum
amount of recovery per victim, or to choose to recognise certain types of claitns
rather than others.46 We think that courts should not engage in this sort of
line drawing in the name of what public policy supposedly demands, however.
In the face of legislative inaction, courts should simply apply traditional tort
tests, such äs reasonable foreseeability and proven recognised injury, and
should not endeavour to decide when liability decided on this basis will be
too great for potential defendants to bear.47
It may be easier for courts to accept the application of the traditional tests
when one considers what will be the treatment of a large group of potential
emotional distress victims - professional rescue workers, including police
officers, who can be involved in terribly stressful rescue operations. Take, for
example, the case of the tragedy at a football match in England in 1989, where
nearly 100 people were crushed to death and hundreds more were injured
after a police officer negligently opened a gate and trapped a large part of
the crowd in a confined space. The British House of Lords rejected the claims
for psychiatric damage brought on behalf of other police officers who
witnessed the events äs they attempted to rescue the injured and attend to
the dead.48 In principle, this seems correct to us. To use the German concept
once again, one can expect more 'physischer oder psychischer Widerstands-
kraft' ('physical or mental resistance') from professionals such äs on duty police
officers. Furthermore, it is more reasonable to expect them (or their employers)
to insure themselves in advance - äs they are in the Netherlands - than it is
for potential victims of a disaster over which they will have had no control,
such äs witnesses to an air crash or an explosion. Jurisdictions in the US gen-
erally bar claims for rescue workers' injuries of any kind under the so-called
'fire fighter's rule', which is a specialised form of the concept of assumption
of risk.49 Thus, if these traditional rules continue to be followed, a large class
of potential suits need not be considered.
45 Mullany and Handford, op. at. , at p. 312.
46 For example, the Law Commission's Report, op. at., at pp. 121-25, contains specific recom-
mendations to the British Parliament for legislation to codify new liability rules for aspects
of the law on negligently inflicted psychiatric illness, deliberately leaving much of the law
to develop through judicial decisions.
47 Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984) (opinion of Justice Deane) is an example of
a high court justice taking this approach.
48 White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshm Police, [1999] 2 A.C. 455, [1999] l All ER 1. The
House of Lords addressed the psychiatric illness claims of other witnesses to this tragedy
previously. Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [1992] l AC 310; [1991] 4 AU
ER 907.
49 See Dobbs, op. ctt., at pp. 769-79. Dutch case law is not available.
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3 THE BIJLMER CRASH AND THE JUDGEMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF
AMSTERDAM
As mentioned above, in the case of the Bijlmer crash Boeing (and El AI) were
able to agree a settlement with most of the victims based on the zone of danger
test. Victims who were within this zone were able in a number of cases to
submit fairly scant evidence of their damage.
However, it was not possible to reach a solution satisfactory to everyone.
It was no coincidence that the claims presented to the court for resolution were
of people who were outside the zone of danger at the time of the crash. The
court had to consider the claims of 23 plaintiffs. In the majority of cases the
claims were for emotional distress; compensation for pecuniary damage was
also claimed in a few cases, including one claim for repayment of moving
expenses.
Before dealing with these individual claims, the Amsterdam court gave
its opinion on the question whether the zone of danger approach was decisive.
The court held that it was not:
Before dealing with the separate claims, the court will discuss the general defence
submitted by Boeing with regard to the claims that have been submitted for non-
pecuniary damage. The court would state at the outset that the test whether the
plaintiffs were, at the time of the crash, within a radius of 100 metres of the place
where the aircraft crashed (described by the parties äs the 'zone of danger') cannot
always be deemed decisive. The mere fact that people who were outside the zone
of danger defined in this way can, in retrospect, be seen objectively not to have
been in danger of their lives does not alter the fact that they may have suffered
shock that can in certain circumstances be imputed to Boeing. In view of the
exceptional seriousness and scope of the consequences of the crashing of an aircraft
on two blocks of occupied apartments, the court considers it quite conceivable that
a person may have suffered psychiatric damage if he or she was in the vicinity
of the crash, albeit outside (or just outside) the zone of danger, and believed that
he or she had to flee for his or her life or was confronted with the consequences
in some other shocking way. There does not appear to be any reason why the
Standard infringed by Boeing should not extend to provide protection for the
interests of these people.
In view of our earlier advocacy of a multifactor approach, it will come äs no
surprise that we endorse the reasoning of the court. It should be noted that
the court did not reject the zone of danger approach. As is evident from the
outcome of the many settlement procedures, this approach is very practical
in many situations. But this does not mean that it is 'always decisive'.
This position means that ultimately each case must be assessed on its own
merits. But it was here that the court proved much stricter. In cases where
compensation for pecuniary damage was claimed, the claim was refused
because the items of damage had been insufficiently specified. In respect of
a claim for compensation for removal expenses (totalling DFL 25,000), the court
held that:
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Boeing has, in the view of the court, rightly disputed the causal connection between
the removal and the related costs. It has, after all, been submitted that the reason
for the removal was that [Plaintiff 1] did not wish to be continually reminded of
the disaster and there were many empty flats. Although these are understandable
reasons for the removal, the connection with the Bijlmer disaster is too remote to
hold that Boeing must reimburse the costs connected with the removal. For this
reason alone this part of the claim of [Plaintiff 1] must be rejected, quite apart from
the fact that [Plaintiff 1] has not provided a sufficient specification of the relevant
costs.
And finally, äs regards the clairns for compensation for non-pecuniary damage,
only two of the plaintiffs were successful. Each of them received an amount
of DFL 5,000. In eleven cases, the claim was, however, refused because it had
been insufficiently proven. This was so even in the two cases in which the
victims were able to file a certificate showing that they were suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder; evidently their story was not deemed sufficiently
reliable.
4 A FURTHER ANALYSIS
4.1 A victim-oriented approach
The current Dutch law on compensation was codified in 1992 when the new
Civil Code became law. In the case of compensation for damage resulting from
injury, the manner in which the courts Interpret and apply the rules is regarded
äs 'victim-friendly' or 'victim-oriented'.
For example, the rules relating to the causal connection are applied relative-
ly flexibly (see section 4.3 below). In addition, the rule that 'the tortfeasor must
take the victim äs he finds htm' generally works very much to the advantage
of victims.50 That one victim is more sensitive than the other and therefore
will be more susceptible to mental traumas is mostly immaterial. This rule
is generally accepted although, for example, the German judge will sometimes
require 'ein Minimum an physischer oder psychischer Widerstandskraft' ('a
minimum of physical or mental resistance'). If this is missing the claim will
be rejected.51 Finally, psychiatric damage is being accepted increasingly easily
äs a 'normal' item of damage, and indeed even äs a 'stand-alone injury'.
50 For example, in the case of a victim that had to be decided by Amsterdam District Court,
it was found that the aircraft crash had caused her to relive earlier traumatic experiences.
The psychologist to whom she had gone for treatment regarded the victim äs a so-called
second-generation victim: born in a semi-Jewish environment shorüy after the war. Accord-
ing to this expert, this had to some extent shaped her personality, including her 'mental
state'. As Boeing did not dispute her statement, the court proceeded on the assumption
that it was correct.
51 For further German case law, see Hermann Lange, Schadensersatz, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)
Tübingen 1990, at p. 132 and 141 ff.
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4.2 No frivolous claims allowed
As against this, the Dutch courts also have a number of Instruments at their
disposal with which they can submit the claim of a victim to critical scrutiny.
We have already encountered three of them in the judgement of the Amster-
dam court. For example, the plaintiff must make out a plausible case for his
claim and must provide sufficient proof, failing which the claim (or possibly
part of the claim) will be dismissed. 'Making out a plausible case' refers not
only to the mental state of the victim (all Statements by experts were accepted
by the court and were also not disputed by Boeing) but also to the resulting
items of damage. As the majority of the victims were unable to provide suffi-
cient proof of their psychiatric injuries, all these claims were dismissed.
4.3 Issues of causation
In addition, the causal connection between the disaster and the psychiatric
injury and between the injury and the specific items of compensation must
be plausibly demonstrated. For example, the court dismissed the claim of one
of the victims, which related to her removal to a safer place, because it deemed
the costs 'too remote'.
It is important to pause and consider for a moment the requirement of
proximate cause. It is ultimately a matter of what damage (reasonably) can
be attributed to the tortfeasor äs a consequence of the event causing the dam-
age. Article 6:98 of the Dutch Civil Code employs a so-called multifactor
approach. It is not only Üieforeseeabüity of the damage that is important, since
other factors also play a role. Article 6:98 itself offers the court two factors
from which it can perhaps decide the extent of liability: it must consider the
nature ofthe liability and the nature ofthe damage. A fourth factor is the remote-
ness of the damage: it may be so remote that imputation of liability can no
longer be justified. A fifth factor that can play a role is the extent of culpability.
For example, damage that is caused intentionally is more eligible for compensa-
tion than damage caused by a slight degree of negligence. It follows that the
court will have to arrive at decision based on the reasonableness criterion -
and explain its reasons for its decision.
We would like to consider two of these factors at rather greater length.
The nature of the liability can be a reason to define the extent of the liability
more narrowly or indeed more broadly. Let us first examine an example of
a closer connection. In some situations, the legislature has imposed strict
liability. Such cases involve a departure from the rule that tortious liability
depends on an element of culpability of the tortfeasor (fault). Where there is
strict liability, there may be reason to define the limits of liability more narrow-
ly or, to put another way, to impute less damage.
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The nature of the damage is found in practice to be of great importance in
the process of imputing damage to the debtor. The damage that a person
suffers may result from the death of another person, from injury, from damage
to property, from damage to the environment, from a loss of business, and
so forth. Each case involves a different type of damage. In the case law, per-
sonal injury can be seen to have a very high priority. It is therefore likely to
be imputed to the tortfeasor. In the case of damage to property or to a business,
the courts may well be more restrained.
It follows that the courts that assess the facts, the Durch district court in
the first instance and then the court of appeal, have a large margin of discretion
in arriving at a reasonable judgement. We will return to one of these factors
in section 5 below.
4.4 Bereavement damages (affectieschade) allowed?
Finally, the court dismissed a claim in part because bereavement damages
(in Durch: Affectieschade) are not allowed under Dutch law. In the case of one
of the victims, post-traumatic stress disorder was, according to a Statement
of the psychologist, the result of a combination of being present at the extreme
edge of the zone of danger and the death of a close woman friend in the
conflagration. In so far äs the latter factor was responsible for the suffering,
the court held that the damage was not eligible for compensation.52 The court
therefore chose to exclude bereavement damages.
We see various problems associated with the bereavement issue. For
example, it would be virtually impossible to determine in the case of a specific
victim who is acknowledged to suffer from a recognised psychiatric illness
to what extent the consequent damage is attributable to either the disaster or
to the relationship with another (deceased) victim. The court did not make
any attempt whatever to make a distinction, but simply fixed the amount of
damages (DFL 5,000).
But even more important than this practical objection is an objection of
principle to the exclusion of bereavement äs a ground for compensation. Why
should serious mental injury caused to a great extent by the fact that a relative
has died äs the consequence of a tort not be eligible for compensation? For
example, The Hague Court of Appeal recently allowed a claim by the parents
of a murdered child against the murderer. The parents had suffered very
serious mental distress äs a result of the murder and the court properly did
52 Compare, e.g., Krause v. Graham, 19 Cal.Sd 59, 562 P.2d 1022 (Calif. Sup.Ct. 1977) (dis-
allowing claim for mental anguish due to wrongf ul death, while allowing claim for recovery
for mental anguish resulting from plaintiff witnessing an impact in which his wife was
killed).
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not dismiss the claim on the ground that it simply concerned compensation
for bereavement.53
This division, äs reflected in the Dutch court decisions, is mirrored when
one looks at the law in other jurisdictions. For example, under US law, the
mental anguish and grief experienced by survivors äs a result of the death
of a loved one generally are not considered compensable injuries.54 Even in
those few US states recognising such recovery, it is typically compensable only
if the grief is 'more than normal'.55 Similarly, in many European countries,
such äs the Scandinavian countries and Germany, äs well äs under the common
law, bereavement damages ('affectieschade') äs a result of the loss or injuring
of a loved one are not compensable.56 However, in certain other countries,
such äs Belgium, France, Scotland, and Spain, a rather small and fixed amount
of money (sometimes called solatium) is awarded to specified relatives for
bereavement, regardless of whether any such damage was actually suffered.57
In the Netherlands, the Leiden researcher dr. Siewert Lindenbergh is
promoting such a solution.58 He suggests an amount of ca. 10.000 Euro.59 It
seems äs if this approach is gathering support in the Netherlands. However,
we do not belong to these supporters. What really should be at issue is whether
the injury is sufficiently serious. This is why we have previously suggested
the use of the more general principle of recognised psychiatric illness. What
is presently described äs bereavement damage will often not fulfil the require-
ments of this definition. The German Bundesgerichtshof uses the term 'Gesund-
heitsverletzung' and requires that the injury:
über noch im Bereich normaler Reaktion liegende Erscheinungen von Schmerz,
Treuer und Niedergeschlagenheit hinaus unmittelbar zu einer 'traumatischen'
Schädigung der physischen und psychischen Gesundheit gefuhrt hat.60
Bereavement damage will not generally satisfy the requirement of 'Schmerz'
i.e., more than normal. But, we want to emphasise that the possibility of
53 The Hague Court of Appeal 26 April 2000.
54 See, e.g., Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 US 573, 586-87 n.17 (1974).
55 Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320,1326 (8th Cir. 1989). See generally G. Boston et al, Emotional
Infunes: Law and Practice West Group 1998 6-57 - 6-63.
56 What is compensated, though, is damage for the loss of support (material damages) suffered
by certain individuals, such äs the spouse and the minor children (art. 6:108 CC). Non-
pecuniary damages, or material damages suffered by victims not mentioned in art. 6:108
are not entitled to compensation. See also Peter B. Kutner, 'Damages for Injuries to Family
Members: Does Reform Mean Abolition?, l Torts L.J. 231 (1993) (reviewing law and reform
proposals in many countries).
57 See, e.g., The Law Commission Consultahon Paper No. 148, Claims for Wrongful Death (1997);
Peter B. Kumer, Reforming Wrongful Death Law, 7 Torts L.J. l (1999) (both reviewing
availability of bereavement damages in many countries).
58 S.D. Lindenbergh, Smartengeld, Kluwer Deventer 1998. p. 174̂
59 Wem, p. 217. Recently: S.D. Lindenbergh, 'Smartengeld voor naasten', NJB 2001, p. 61 ff.
60 BGHZ 56, 163, 167 (11 May 1971).
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compensation for bereavement damages ('affectieschade') should not be
exduded.
4.5 Our opinion
The general picture is therefore that although the Amsterdam court does not
wish the victims to continue to labour under the yoke of the zone of danger
test, it will examine carefully whether the Claims should actually be granted.
We wholeheartedly support this approach, without wishing to express an
opinion on the correctness of the decision which the court went on to make
in each of the cases. Appeal is still possible and, furthermore, we have too
little information to form our own judgement on the individual outcomes.
To return to the question of the different tests, our preference would be
for a multifactor approach. Arbitrarily drawing a circle around the area where
the disaster occurred (the zone of danger) should not be decisive.61 The way
in which the circle is drawn is not a matter which should escape the judgement
of the court, if only because the circle is in fact often drawn by the party that
is liable. In addition, victims in personal injury cases deserve individual
assessment of their cases. However, for settlement purposes, the parties would
be free to apply different Standards in so far äs it concerns proof of the dam-
age. The parties might agree to take a more accommodating approach within
the circle and a stricter approach outside it. One could say äs a rule of thumb
that the further the victim was situated beyond the zone of danger the more
critical the parties and, if necessary, the court should be in granting any claim
and determining the compensation. Various legal Instruments are available
to the court for this purpose. We do not therefore categorically reject the zone
of danger approach. In practice, the settlement procedure has proved to
function very reasonably. But it cannot be decisive.
We also advocate that compensation should be awarded only in cases of
serious mental injury, supported by evidence that the victim is suffering a
recognisable psychiatric illness.62 We would not therefore wish compensation
to be paid for bereavement in so far äs this is tantamount to lesser forms of
'mental suffering' which constitute a 'normal' reaction to the suffering or loss
of others. Bereavement damages, the emotional damages suffered by a third
party äs a consequence of the death or serious suffering of a loved one should
be compensated, but only if there is proximate cause between the tragic event
(the disaster) and the bereavement damages, leading to a recognisable psychiatric
illness. We, therefore, reject Solutions äs chosen in several European countries
(such äs France, Belgium and Spain), where a rather small and fixed amount
6l See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ford Motor Co., 2000 WL 343777 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (establishing extent
of zone of danger through testimony of competing expert witnesses).
62 The Law Commission Report, op. dt., at par. 5.1-5.6, also endorses this requirement.
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of money is awarded, even if there is no recognisable psychiatric damage. The
proposed solution also avoids the problem noted by others that the bereaved
sometimes have perceived symbolic awards äs an insulting Statement about
the low instrinsic value of the deceased.63 Unless the legislature comes under
periodic pressure to increase the value of the symbolic award, it will become
embarrassingly low over time.64
In short, we would advocate a System where (i) by means of a multifactor
approach it is decided whether or not an alleged victim, who was not directly
and physically affected by the event, has in principle a right to claim compen-
sation, and (ii) where by means of assessing the seriousness of the injury and
by carefully considering the requirement of proximate cause (a strong indica-
tion of proximate cause would of course be the loss of a loved one), the amount
of compensation (material damages in the first place, and, see however below,
non-pecuniary damages) is determined. This, in our opinion, also applies to
victims who suffer because of the loss or the injuring of a loved one, regardless
of the family links (affectieschade). What should be decisive is the seriousness
of the psychiatric illness. The loss of a loved one is, in our proposal, no more
and no less than one of the possibilities that might lead to the development
of a serious psychiatric illness. It should not be a separate heading that needs
special legislation, such äs in France, Spain and Belgium.
4.6 A zone of emotional danger approach?
The Dutch author Verhey would go much further than we have proposed,
however. In an interesting article, he proposes a Zone of Emotional Danger.
Anyone within this zone at the time of the disaster should be eligible to
compensation for damage due to mental injury. He departs completely from
the zone of danger:
Rejecting the 'Zone of Physical Danger' means bidding farewell to thinking which
has not yet torn itself away from the notion of the dualism of body and spirit.
Psychiatric damage is compensated in this approach only in so far äs the victim
was himself in physical danger.65
We are, however, not in favour of exchanging the physical danger test for an
emotional danger test. This would be simply yet another attempt at alleged
clarity. Verhey's proposed test would need further delimitation and definition.
63 The Law Commission Report No. 148, op cit., at 81; Kutner, op cit.
64 See, e.g., Alberto Law Reform Institute, Non-Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions
- A Review of Section 8 of the Fatal Accidents Act 11, 43 (Report No. 66, 1993) (calling
for legislature to increase amount of statutory bereavement damages from $3000 and to
seek review of amounts at least once every five years).
65 A.J. Verhey, Shockschade, N/B 1999, at 1416.
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Where are the boundaries of such a zone of emotional danger? And even such
boundaries do not, in our view, provide any value added in relation to the
multifactor approach which we advocate. In this subject matter it is, perhaps
more than in any other, a case of ins in causa positum.
If a court perceives the need for a limiting test, a zone of physical danger
provides much more certainty than a zone of emotional danger. Coincidentally,
this is demonstrated by the manner in which the Bijlmer disaster was handled.
In so far äs the victims were inside the zone of danger fixed by Boeing and
El AI, they received compensation. A court was clearly not necessary for this
purpose. What remained was a handful of cases the seriousness of which might
be sceptically questioned by an outsider (see the judgement of the court). We
cannot form a real opinion about this, but the small number alone - ultimately
seventeen - does not indicate the necessity of introducing a vague test of this
kind. A zone of danger determined on a reasonable basis is evidently sufficient
in a settlement stage. What is important - and the court recognised this correct-
ly - is that a zone of danger 'should not automatically be decisive'.
5 A (HARSH?) PROPOSAL: NO NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES
Nonetheless, the question arises of whether the multifactor approach entails
the risk of unleashing a flood of Claims. This question needs to be considered
much more carefully in the case of large-scale disasters than in the case of
accidents that result in only a few victims. This is because the fact that the
claim is not subject to any physical limit (the Amsterdam court has, after all,
rejected the notion that the zone of danger is automatically decisive) combined
with the fact that the nature of the damage is 'psychiatric' (a form of injury
that is by its very nature potentially 'unlimited') means that there is a real
danger of a flood of Claims.
It was for this reason that we suggested in the conclusion to our 1997 article
that a differentiation could be made on the basis of the type of damage and
in particular that a distinction should be made between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage. Psychiatric damage may result in both pecuniary damage
(e.g., doctors' fees, loss of income) and in non-pecuniary damage (e.g., stress
and other emotional suffering). Of the two - compensation for pecuniary
damage and compensation for non-pecuniary damage - the former deserves
in our view the greater priority. The absence of compensation for pecuniary
damage places a heavier bürden on the everyday life of the victim (particularly
if this damage is not covered by insurance) than the absence of compensation
for non-pecuniary damage.
Our Suggestion therefore is that, particularly in the case of victims outside
the zone of danger in large-scale disasters, a legislature (by Statute or treaty)
might choose to distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
claims. If the legislature concludes that the potential flood of Claims is too great
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and arbitrary choices have to be made, it might adopt a more generous
approach to the Claims for compensation for pecuniary damage caused by
psychiatric injury than to the Claims for compensation for non-pecuniary
damage, which a legislature might well conclude deserve lower priority. We
pointed to this possibility in our article on aviation accidents.66 Ultimately,
if choices need to be made, the victim benefits more - in our view - from a
reimbursement of pecuniary damage than for a reimbursement for pain and
suffering.
We expect that this type of legislative limitation on recoverable damage
will, however, be more acceptable in the various European legal Systems than
in the United States.67 In Europe, the concept of damages for pain and suffer-
ing has a mostly symbolic value; the amount of such damages is seldom äs
closely related to the seriousness of the injury äs it is in the US. In addition,
in the US, the damages for non-pecuniary loss in effect serve äs a source of
payment of fees for the plaintiffs' attorneys, which would not be recoverable
from the defendants under prevailing American rules. For example, in July
2000, the United States Congress passed legislation restoring the availability
of non-pecuniary damages in commercial airline crashes for the wrongful death
of passengers. The legislation took effect retroactively so that the relatives of
victims of the crash of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996 could benefit from the
liberalised damage rules.68
The Situation in the Netherlands is that not only the legislature can deter-
mine this priority (äs in the American Death on the High Seas Act), but also
possibly the court. In section 4.3, we discussed earlier the causality article in
the Dutch Civil Code. Article 6:98 of the Qvil Code indicates a number of
factors which the court must take into account when deciding on the question
of whether there is an adequate causal connection between certain items of
damage and the event leading to the disaster. One of them was the nature of
the damage. This factor provides the court with the opporrunity to differentiate
between different types of damage. It may, for example, be more inclined to
conclude that there is a causal connection in cases of personal injury than,
for example, in cases of damage to property. And in our view, it can also
differentiate between different types of personal injury, for example between
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Our proposal would be that in cases
66 Stoiker and Levine, op. cit., at p. 69.
67 See also David F. Partlett, 'Tort Liability and the American Way: Reflections on Liability
for Emotional Distress', 45 Am. J. Compamtive L. 171,178 (1997)(book review), contending
that Mullany and Handford's proposed "solution of turning liability on a showing of
'recognized psychiatric illness' is a reasonable prescription for Commonwealth jurisprudence
but incompatible with the rivened foundation of emotional distress liability in the United
States."
68 P.L. 106-181 sec. 404, modifying Death on the High Seas Act. For judicial Interpretation
of the Act's possible application to the TWA crash prior to its recent modification, see: In
re Air Crash Off Lang Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000).
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in which the physical and/or emotional distance is greater (the victim was
undeniably outside the zone of danger) but in which psychiatric damage can
nonetheless be established, the court should be more inclined to allow compen-
sation for pecuniary damage than for non-pecuniary damage.
The award of DFL 5,000 (a limited amount even by the Standards of Dutch
law on pain and suffering) by Amsterdam District Court in two cases may
be an example of this differentiation.
6 CONCLUSION
The inherently shocking nature of major disasters, such äs exploding chemical
plants or commercial aviation accidents, is self-evident. We believe (hat it is
not appropriate arbitrarily to refuse to extend liability to compensate all those
who suffer serious psychiatric injury äs a result of such disasters. Companies
operating aircraft, chemical plants and the like can foresee the possibility of
a substantial number of victims, if they are found to be liable for the disaster.
Thus, they may owe a duty of care to many more people than those who
happen to have been in the Zone of Danger at the time of the disaster.
Therefore, in this article we have advocated a multifactor approach for
courts to use in determining which victims of disasters should be given com-
pensation. Only those who are suffering from a serious and recognised psychi-
atric illness should even be eligible for compensation. In establishing whether
any recognised psychiatric illness was proximately caused by the disaster,
courts should be able to consider - äs guidelines, not äs rigid requirements -
factors such äs the victim's tie of love and affection to someone physically
injured in the disaster, the victim's closeness in space and time to the incident
or its aftermath, and the means by which the victim learned of the disaster.
Although we believe that a Zone of Danger approach is ultimately too arbit-
rary, we recognise the possible merit of such an approach äs a tool in attempt-
ing to settle a large number of Claims which may arise from a single large
disaster.
Finally, we propose that if the legislature determines that the extent of
compensation for psychiatric damage äs a result of accidents or disasters must
be limited, for victims who have suffered recognised psychiatric illness only,
recovery for pecuniary damage should take precedence over non-pecuniary
damage. We do not support approaches, äs taken by some European legis-
larures, where a token sum of money is awarded, regardless of whether there
is in fact any damage suffered.
We believe that these recommendations will balance the needs of victims
who have endured real injuries while meeting the concerns of those who fear
unleashing the detrimental economic effects of unlimited liability.
